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I sure hope it gets to some real meat and potatos soon. I am not really sure of what I was actually expecting but I never thought it would be so slow in its presentation. I have been reading it about 3 weeks on and off and so far this book has been very easy to put down, reading only about 15 minute sessions-that's all I can stand. I am about 1/4 of the way through this book and so far there is no real new information I didn't already know. The book starts off super slow.
The only mystery is how such a nice middle-of-the-roader got to the senior staff of the most ardently partisan administration of the past 50 years. And McClellan is such a vanilla, decent kind of guy. Yawn. The Bush term is only recently over and the Plame affair already feels like ancient history.
Worth a read if you are interested in the inner workings and challenges a White House press secretary faces daily, especially in this administration, but don't expect anything earth-shattering. The backstory in the first few chapters drags and almost lead me to quit reading but the later storyline gets better. This intimate account of the George W. Bush years was an interesting read but I was a bit disappointed that there were no bombshells, nothing highly revealing that I didn't already know.
I think the book is interesting, and helps to show the truth of my prior assertions. McClellan is a nave and a fool, in the words of Ann Coulter, he's a retard, and also a traitor. Scott McClellan was a traitor to the man who gave him his career. McClellan's entire political life, and post-political fame is enirely due to former President Bush's trust in him and his care and help.
It's apparent from this narrative that McClellan, Bush, and the rest of the Texas crew just thought they were more decent than the smarmy Clinton crowd and did not focus much on policy. If you like Bush, McClellan's book has the goody-two-shoes feel of the turncoat John Dean. Also embarrassing is the years of planning and overwhelming resources put into rebuilding Germany and Europe after WWII, compared to the la-di-da, we'll-get-everything-done-with-no-planning-and-150,000-troops-who-let-the-citizens-loot thinking of the Bush crew. The confessional nature of McClellan's memoir is guaranteed to rub everyone the wrong way.
Putting aside my own prejudices, it's difficult to argue with the core decency and sincerity of McClellan, or of Bush for that matter. Their politics was personal, and the all the corruptions of personal politics followed. Lincoln was a fantastic, bare-knuckles patronage politician. But he also knew that the purpose of being a good politician was to enable one to be a good statesman. Bush's press secretary has written a confessional narrative of the Administration's failure to live up to its bipartisan, uniter-not-a-divider ideals. He concludes that we need to end the "perpetual campaign" adopted by Clinton and Bush and focus more on governing as statesmen above politics. But McClellan does provide a devastating critique of the unreal "bubble" that surrounds the President and the passivity and lack of intellectual curiosity that made Bush peculiarly susceptible to the "bubble."On Iraq, McClellan argues that WMD was not at the heart of Bush's thinking; it was more of a symbol and rallying point for Bush's case for war. But McClellan points out that Bush fell for the Wolfowitz line and that a larger geopolitical ambition to stabilize the Middle East by injecting power in the region like we did in Germany after WWII is critical to understanding Bush's decision for war.The tragedy is how superficial Bush's thinking was in this regard, and how little thought he gave to the political, cultural, military, and historical differences between Iraq and Germany.
McClellan argues that this was Cheney's and Rumsfeld's thinking, which explains why they gave little attention to the grandiose nation building rhetoric of Wolfowitz and the Neo-Cons. Once they were in power, things would be better because they were just so good and decent and so reflective of American values. Somehow the Bush crew lost sight of this simple truth. They really did not have any well-thought-out, larger policy goals to advance. The Oliver Stone theory that Bush felt devastated and betrayed when he found no WMD is ridiculous. No wonder they succumbed to the temptations of Rove wedge politics and the permanent campaign.
His reform prescriptions are a bit on the milquetoast side: he proposes a "Deputy Chief of Staff for Governance." Gee, shouldn't that be the Chief of Staff's job -- or, God forbid, maybe the President himself should spend some of his time thinking about policy. All of which points to the fatal flaw of both Bush and McClellan. The point was he was a potential threat and a useful demonstration target for the new policy of preemptive war. And if you hate Bush (is there really any inbetween)., well McClellan comes off as incredibly naive -- a bit like Robin on the old "Batman" series ("Gee Willikers, Bushman, let's jump in the Rovemobile and go after that evil Osama."). In Bush's mind, so what if Saddam was 6 months away or 6 years away from WMD.
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